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T

HIS ESSAY WILL DEAL WITH THE PROGRESSION OF HOSTILITIES in an

inter,State war.1 More specifically, the various modes for the initia,
tion, suspension and termination of hostilities will be addressed.
I. The Initiation of War
(a) War in the Technical Sense
War in the technical sense starts with a declaration of war. A declaration of
war is a unilateral and formal announcement, issued by the constitutionally
competent authority of a State, setting the exact point at which war begins
with a designated enemy (or enemies). Notwithstanding its unilateral charac,
ter, a declaration of war "brings about a state of war irrespective of the attitude
of the state to which it is addressed."2
According to Article 1 of Hague Convention (III) of 1907 Relative to the
Commencement of Hostilities,
The contracting Powers recognize that hostilities between themselves must not
commence without previous and explicit warning, in the form either of a
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declaration of war, giving reasons, or of an ultimatum with a conditional
declaration of war)

Article 1 explicitly mentions that reasons for a declaration of war must be
given. But the causes of wars cannot be seriously established on the basis of a
self-serving unilateral declaration. The main value of a declaration of war is
derived from the fact that it pinpoints the precise time when a state of war
enters into force.
An ultimatum may take one of two forms: (i) a threat that, if certain demands are not complied with, hostilities will be initiated; or (ii) a warning that,
unless specific conditions are fulfilled by a designated deadline, war will commence ipso facto. 4 Article 1 requires an ultimatum of the second type, incorporating a conditional declaration of war. Britain and France dispatched such
ultimatums to Germany in September 1939.5An ultimatum of the first category
is not deemed sufficient by itself under Article 1, and it must be followed by a
formal declaration of war. Only the subsequent declaration, rather than the
preliminary threat, would be in conformity with Hague Convention (III).6
An ultimatum, almost by definition, entails a lapse of time (brief as it may
be) providing an opportunity for compliance with the demands made. Hostilities are not supposed to begin unless that period has expired and the response
is considered unsatisfactory.
Insofar as an outright declaration of war is concerned, Hague Convention
(III) does not insist on any meaningful interval before combat starts. 7 Article 1
does prescribe that the declaration must be made "previous" to the commencement of hostilities, and even refers to it (on a par with an ultimatum) as a warning. However, it is significant that a proposed amendment of the Article, to the
effect that 24 hours must pass between the issuance of the declaration and the
outbreak of hostilities, was defeated in the course of the Hague Conference. 8
The upshot is that fire may be opened almost immediately after the announcement has been made.9 A declaration of war under the Convention constitutes
merely a formal measure, and it does not necessarily deny the advantage of surprise to the attacking State.
Hague Convention (III) cannot be considered a reflection of customary internationallaw. lO Before the Convention, most wars were precipitated without
a prelude in the form of a declaration of war. I I The practice of States has not
changed substantially since the conclusion of the Convention. Some hostilities
are preceded by declarations of war, but this is the exception rather than the
rule. There are many reasons for the contemporary reluctance to engage in a
declaration of war. Some of these reasons are pragmatic, stemming, for
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instance, from a desire to avert the automatic application of the (international
no less than domestic) laws of neutrality activated during war. The paucity of
declarations of war at the present juncture is also linked, paradoxically, to the
illegality and criminality of wars of aggression. The contemporary injunction
against war has not yet eliminated its incidence. Nevertheless, the prohibition
has definitely created a psychological environment in which belligerents prefer
using a different terminology, such as "international armed conflict."IZ Since
States are indisposed to employ the expression "war," they naturally eschew
declarations of "war."
Even when a declaration of war is issued, in many instances this is done after
the first strike, so that the act constitutes no more than an acknowledgement of
a state of war already in progress; occasionally, the declaration is articulated by
the State under attack, and it merely records that the enemy has launched
war. 13 Of course, a post~attack declaration of war (by either party) is not in ac~
cordance with Hague Convention (III).
When enunciated, a declaration of war does not require "any particular
Iann," although it must be authorized by a competent organ of the State. 14 Lack
of preSCribed form should not be confused with rhetorical flourish. It must be
appreciated that not every bellicose tum of phrase in a harangue delivered by a
Head of State before a public gathering can be deemed a declaration of war. In
the Dalmia Cement International Chamber of Commerce arbitration of 1976,
P. Lalive held that a broadcast aired by the President of Pakistan in 1965-in
which a statement was made that Pakistan and India were "at war"---did not
amount to a declaration of war pursuant to international law, inasmuch as it
"in no way was, or purported to be, a 'communication' to India."15 The insis~
tence on the transmittal of an official communication to the antagonist may be
exaggerated, but surely a declaration of war-in whatever form-must (at the
very least) be publicly announced in an explicit and lucid manner. One cannot
accept the assertion by a United States Federal District Court in 1958, in the
Ulysses case, that Egypt had declared war (consonant with international law)
against Britain and France, in November 1956, in a public speech made by
President Nasser before a large crowd in Cairo.l 6 The Court admitted that the
speech had been misunderstood or disregarded at the time, but it relied on the
fact that a subsequent official Egyptian statement confirmed that it had been
intended as a declaration of war. I7 However, the very misunderstanding of the
purport of the speech at the point of delivery weakens the Court's position.
President Nasser's speech was simply "neither definite nor unequivocal"
enough as a declaration of war. IS If it is to have any value at all, a declaration of
war must impart an unambiguous signal to all concerned.
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(b) War in the Material Sense
War in the material sense unfolds irrespective of any formal steps. Its occur,
rence is contingent only on the actual outbreak of comprehensive hostilities
between two or more States. Hence, war in the material sense commences with
an invasion or another mode of an armed attack. In the past, an air raid (a la
Pearl Harbor) or an artillery bombardment would be emblematic. In the future,
a devastating computer network attack (with massive lethal consequences) is
equally likely to occur. 19 Actual hostilities may begin (i) without a declaration
of war ever being made; (ii) prior to a declaration of war, which follows after,
wards; (iii) simultaneously with a declaration of war; or (iv) subsequent to a
declaration of war. Moreover, war in the material sense (viz active hostilities)
may not commence at all, notwithstanding a declaration of war. This is what
transpired between a number of Latin American countries and Germany dur,
ing World WarII. 20
When the outbreak of comprehensive hostilities does not coincide with a
declaration of war (especially when the declaration lags behind the inception of
the actual fighting and, more particularly, when it is issued by the State under
attack), there is likely to be some doubt as to whether war was triggered by the
action or by the declaration. 21 In such a setting, it is quite possible that different
dates for the outbreak of the war will be used for disparate purposes, such as the
status of enemy nationals and the application of neutrality laws. 22
Article 2 of Hague Convention (III)23 stipulates that the existence of a state
of war must be notified to neutral States without delay, and it shall not take ef,
fect in regard to them as long as the notification has not been received. All the
same, the article lays down that, if a neutral country is in fact aware of the state
of war, it cannot rely on the absence of notification. Under modern conditions,
since a state of war habitually gets wide coverage in the news media, any special
notification to neutrals may well be redundant. Still, should there be any doubt
whether the hostilities qualify as an all,out war or are short of war, the commu,
nication to neutral countries (or the absence thereof) is of practical importance
even in the present day.
II. The Termination of War
(a) Treaties of Peace

i. The Significance of a Treaty of Peace
The classical and ideal method for the termination of inter,State war is the
conclusion of a treaty of peace between the belligerents. Traditionally, treaties
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of peace have had an extraordinary impact on the evolution of international
law, from Westphalia (1648) to Versailles (1919). The series of treaties of
peace signed at the close of the World War I even encompassed, in their first
part (Articles 1~26), the Covenant of the League ofNations 24 (the predecessor
of the United Nations). Despite their unique political standing, treaties of
peace are no different juridically from other types of inter~State agreements,
and they are governed by the general law of treaties. 25
After World War II, and as a direct consequence of the "Cold War," no
treaty of peace could be reached with the principal vanquished country (Ger~
many), which was divided for 45 years. It was only in 1990, following a sea
change in world politics, that a Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to
Germany26 could be formulated. The Preamble of this instrument records the
fact that the peoples of the contracting parties (the United States, the USSR,
the United Kingdom, France and the two Germanies) "have been living to~
gether in peace since 1945."27 In Article 1, a united Germany (comprising the
territories of the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Re~
public and the whole of Berlin) is established, and "the definitive nature" of its
borders-especially with Poland-is confirmed. 28 The 1990 Treaty may be
deemed a final peace settlement for Germany.29
Treaties of Peace with five minor Axis countries-Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary,
Romania, and Finland-were concluded already in 1947 at Paris.30 The West~
em Allied Powers arrived at a Treaty of Peace with Japan in San Francisco in
1951.31 The USSR was not a contracting party to the latter instrument. In~
stead, a Joint Declaration was adopted by the USSR and Japan, in 1956,
whereby the state of war between the two parties was brought to an end.3 2 The
Joint Declaration sets forth that negotiations aimed at a treaty of peace will
continue.33 However, since it proclaims that the state of war is ended, and that
peace, friendship, and good neighborly relations are restored,34 including dip~
lomatic and consular relations,35 the Declaration already attains most of the
objectives of an ordinary treaty of peace.
In the international armed conflicts of the post~World War II era, States
commonly try to avoid not only the term "war" but also its corollary "treaty of
peace." Two outstanding exceptions are the Treaties of Peace concluded by Is~
rael with Egypt (in 1979},36 and with Jordan (in 1994}.37
The hallmark of a treaty of peace is that it both (i) puts an end to a preexist~
ing state of war and (ii) introduces or restores amicable relations between the
parties. Two temporal matters are noteworthy in this context. The first relates
to the fixed point in time in which the conclusion of war is effected (the
terminus ad quem). Upon signing a treaty of peace, the parties-at
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their discretion-may choose to employ language indicating that the termina,
tion of the war has either occurred already in the past, is happening at the pres,
ent moment, or will take place in the future. The Israeli practice illustrates all
three options. In the Treaty of Peace with Egypt, Article 1(1) resorts to future
language:
The state of war between the Parties will be terminated and peace will be
established between them upon the exchange ofinstruments of ratification of
this Treaty.38
That is to say, the state of war between Israel and Egypt continued even after
the signature of the Treaty of Peace (in March 1979), and its termination
occurred only upon the subsequent exchange of the instruments of ratification
(the following month).
A different legal technique characterized the peace process between Israel
and Jordan. Article 1 of the Treaty of Peace between the two countries (signed
at the Arava in October 1994) proclaims:
Peace is hereby established between the State of Israel and the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan (the "Parties") effective from the exchange of the
instruments of ratification of this Treaty.39
But as for the state of war, the Preamble of the Treaty reads:
Bearing in mind that in their Washington Declaration of 25 th July, 1994,
they [Israel and Jordan] declared the termination of the state of belligerency
between them. 4
The Washington Declaration ofJ uly 1994 incorporates the following clause:
The long conflict between the two states is now coming to an end. In this s,flirit,
the state of belligerency between Israel and Jordan has been terminated. 1
The upshot is that, whereas peace between Israel and Jordan was established
only upon the ratification of the Arava Treaty of October 1994, the state of war
between the two countries had ended already in July of that year (the date of
the Washington Declaration, which was not subject to ratification).
Unlike the future tense (used in the Treaty of Peace with Egypt) and the
present tense (employed in the Washington Declaration with Jordan), there is
also recourse to the past tense in the Israeli practice. This occurred in the abor,
tive Treaty of Peace between Israel and Lebanon,42 which was signed in May
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1983 (at Qiryat Shemona and Khaldeh) but never entered into force since Leb~
anon declined to ratify it. 43 The instrument is significant only because it sets
forth in Article 1 (2) that
The Parties confirm that the state of war between Israel and Lebanon has been
terminated and no longer exists. 44

It is clear that at Khaldeh and Qiryat Shemona, Lebanon and Israel did not
terminate the war between them at the moment of signature (using the present
tense) or undertake to end it upon ratification (in the future): they confirmed
that the state of war had already ended at some indeterminate stage (in the
past), and that it therefore no longer existed. In contradistinction to the
termination of war in the present or in the future-which, in both instances, is
a constitutive step-the notation that the war has already ended in the past is
merely a declaratory measure.
The second temporal matter is that the dual cardinal aspects of the estab~
lishment of peace-the termination of war and the normalization of rela~
tions-need not be synchronized. Thus, under Article I of the Egyptian~Israeli
Treaty of Peace, while the state of war between the parties is to be terminated
(as shown) upon ratification, "normal and friendly relations" are to be effected
only after a further interim period of three years. 45 The gradual time~table is a
marginal matter. The decisive element ts that a treaty of peace is not just a neg~
ative instrument (in the sense of the negation of war) ; it is also a positive docu~
ment (regulating the normalization of friendly relations between the former
belligerents).46 Normalization produces repercussions in diverse areas, ranging
from diplomatic to cultural exchanges, from navigation to aviation, and from
trade to scientific cooperation. The quintessence of a treaty of peace is writing
finis not only to the armed phase of the conflict between the parties, but to the
conflict as a whole. Hence, in appropriate circumstances, the conclusion of a
treaty of peace constitutes an implied recognition of a contracting party as a
State.47
Patently, a treaty of peace is no guarantee oflasting peace. If the root causes
of the war are not eradicated, another armed conflict may erupt in time. In ad~
dition, the same treaty of peace which closes one war can lay the foundation for
the next one: the Treaty of Versailles is a prime example of this deplorable state
of affairs. But notwithstanding any factual nexus linking the two periods ofhos~
tilities, the interjection of a treaty of peace signifies that legally they must be
viewed as separate wars. Of course, new bones of contention, not foreseen at
the point of signature of a treaty of peace, may also become catalysts to another
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war. When a treaty of peace is acclaimed as a "final" settlement, and statesmen
indulge in high-sounding prognostications as to its power of endurance, it is advisable to recall that most wars commence between parties that have earlier engaged themselves in treaties of peace. The life expectancy of an average treaty
of peace does not necessarily exceed the span of a generation or two. Each generation must work out for itself a fresh formula for peaceful coexistence.

ii. Peace PreliminariesPrior to the entry into force of a definitive treaty of peace, the parties may
agree on preliminaries of peace. Such a procedure generates the following results:
a. In the past, the peace preliminaries themselves might have brought hostilities to an end,48 whereas the ultimate treaty of peace would focus on the process of normalizing relations between the former belligerents. Nowadays, the
function of peace preliminaries of this type will usually be served by an armistice agreement (see infra, (b».
b. At the present time, peace preliminaries generally represent a mere
"pactum de contrahendo on the outline of a prospective peace treaty."49 Unless
and until the projected treaty of peace actually materializes, the final curtain is
not drawn on the war. As an illustration, one can draw attention to the two
Camp David Framework Agreements of 1978 for Peace in the Middle East and
for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israepo Here the parties agreed on certain principles and some specifics, designed to serve as guidelines for a peace settlement. However, as mentioned, the war between Egypt
and Israel was terminated only by dint of the Treaty of Peace (concluded, after
further negotiations, in 1979).
iii. The Legal Validity of a Treaty of Peace
As long as war was regarded as a lawful course of action in international affairs, a treaty of peace was considered perfectly valid, even when imposed on
the defeated party by the victor as an outcome of the use of force. 51 As soon as
the use of inter-State force was forbidden by international law, some scholars
began to argue that a treaty of peace dictated by an aggressor ought to be vitiated by duress. 52 This doctrinal approach has been endorsed in Article 52 of
the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties:
A treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force in
violation of the principles of intemationallaw embodied in the Charter of the
United Nations.53
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Article 52 reflects customary international law as it stands today. In 1973,
the International Court of}ustice held, in a dispute between the United King~
dom and Iceland, in the Fisheries Jurisdiction case:
There can be little doubt, as is implied in the Charter of the United Nations and
recognized in Article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, that
under contemporary international law an agreement concluded under the threat
or use of force is void.54

The International Law Commission, in its commentary on the draft of Arti~
cle 52, explained that the clause does not operate retroactively by invalidating
treaties of peace procured by coercion prior to the development of the modern
law banning the use of force by States. 55 The Commission expressed the opin~
ion that the provision is applicable to all treaties concluded at least since 1945
(the entry into force of the Charter of the United Nations).56
Article 52 does not affect equally all treaties of peace. The text makes it
plain that "only the unlawful use of force ... can bring about the nullity of a
treaty."57 It follows that Article 52 invalidates solely those treaties of peace
which are imposed by an aggressor State on the victim of aggression. As regards
the reverse situation, Article 75 of the Convention proclaims:
The provisions of the present Convention are without prejudice to any
obligation in relation to a treaty which may arise for an aggressor State in
consequence of measures taken in conformity with the Charter of the United
Nations with reference to that State's aggression. 58

The invalidity of a treaty of peace concluded under duress does not result
from "vitiated consent": it is a sanction against an internationally unlawful and
even a criminal act. 59 Hence, there is nothing legally wrong in a treaty of peace
leaning in favor of a State which was the target of aggression (assuming that it
has prevailed militarily).6o In the words of Sir Humphrey Waldock, "[c]learly,
there is all the difference in the world between coercion used by an aggressor to
consolidate the fruits of his aggression in a treaty and coercion used to impose a
peace settlement upon an aggressor."61 Only "unlawful coercion" invalidates a
treaty.62
Article 44(5) of the Vienna Convention does not permit any separation of
the provisions of a treaty falling under Article 52.63 This means that a treaty
procured by coercion is void in its entirety: none of its parts may be severed
from the remainder of the instrument, with a view to being saved from abro~
gation. The general rule would apply, inter alia, to a treaty of peace accepted
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under duress by the victim of aggression. But one must be mindful of the fact
that such a treaty is not always confined to undertakings advantageous to the
aggressor. Indeed, the most momentous clause in the text will presumably be
the one terminating the war. If the whole juridical slate is swept clean by nul~
lity, the section devoted to ending the war would also be wiped off. Is it to be
understood that the former belligerents are put again on a war footing? The an~
swer, as furnished by Article 43 of the Vienna Convention, is that the invalidity
of a treaty does not impair duties embodied therein if these are independently
binding on the parties by virtue of general internationallaw. 64 All States must
comply with the contemporary prohibition of the use of inter~State force, and
the abrogation of a particular treaty of peace does not alter this basic position.
Article 52 refers to a treaty procured by unlawful use or threat of force as
"void." The expression is expounded by Article 69(1), which states that the
"provisions of a void treaty have no legal force."65 The concept underlying Ar~
ticle 52 is one of "absolute nullity. "66 It is true that a party invoking a ground for
impeaching the validity of a treaty must take certain steps enumerated in Arti~
cle 65. 67 The obligation to observe the procedure set out in Article 65 might
suggest that, should the aggrieved party (for reasons of its own) refrain from
contesting the validity of the treaty, nullification would not take place. 68 How~
ever, if that were the case, the instrument would really be voidable rather than
void. If a treaty of peace dictated by an aggressor is genuinely void, it must be
tainted by nullity automatically and ab initio. Therefore, any competent forum
should be authorized to recognize the treaty as void, even if no attempt to in~
voke invalidity has been made by the State directly concerned. 69
(b) Armistice Agreements
Under orthodox international law, an armistice was construed as an inter~
lude in the fighting, interchangeable in substance with a truce or a cease~fire
(see infra, section III). It is characteristic that Articles 36 to 41 of the Hague
Regulations, annexed to Hague Convention (II) of 1899 and (IV) of 1907 Re~
specting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, employ the expression "armi~
stice" when the subject under discussion is the suspension of hostilities. 70 By
contrast, in the current practice of States, an armistice chiefly denotes a termi~
nation of hostilities, completely divesting the parties of the right to renew mili~
tary operations under any circumstances whatever. An armistice of this nature
puts an end to the war, and does not merely suspend the combat.
The transformation undergone by "armistice" as a legal term of art had its
origins in the armistices which brought about the termination of World War
I.71 A close look at the most famous armistice-that of November 11, 1918,
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with Germany-discloses that, although concluded at the outset for a duration
of only 36 days 72 (a period later extended several times 73), its far,reaching pro'
visions (obligating the German armed forces, inter alia, to surrender their arms,
to withdraw from occupied territories as well as from certain areas within Ger,
many itself, etc.) barred the possibility of resumption of hostilities by the van'
quished side. Only the victorious allies reserved to themselves the option of
resorting to force again in case of breach of the Armistice's conditions by Ger,
many. This reading of the text is reinvigorated by the formulation of the last ex'
tension of the Armistice (without an expiry date) in February 1919.74
The innovative trend of terminating war by armistice continued, and be'
came clearer, in the armistices of World War II, which resemble peace prelimi,
naries (of the first category).75 Significantly, in the Armistices with Romania
(1944) and Hungary (1945), these two countries declared that they had "with,
drawn from the war" against the Allied Powers. 76 Romania specifically an'
nounced that it "has entered the war and will wage war on the side of the Allied
Powers against Germany and Hungary,"77 and Hungary agreed to the condi,
tion that it "has declared war on Germany."78 Likewise, Italy-which con'
cluded an armistice with the Allies in September 1943 79-declared war against
Germany in October of that year. The Preamble to the 1947 Paris Treaty of
Peace with Italy directs attention to the fact that (as a result of the declaration
of war) Italy "thereby became a co,belligerent against Germany."80 For a tradi,
tionalist, adhering to the notion of an armistice as a mere suspension ofhostili,
ties, "Italy's co-belligerency created a highly anomalous situation juridically,
and one which to some extent defies legal analysis and classification."8! After
all, if the war between the Allied Powers and Italy did not end until the Treaty
of Peace of 1947, Italy-the armed forces of which were fighting, after 1943,
alongside Allied formations against a common foe {Germany)82-was the
co-belligerent of its enemies! Yet, once it is perceived that an armistice signifies
the termination of war, there is no anomaly in the status ofItaly during World
War II. Earlier, Italy was a co,belligerent with Germany against the Allies. Fol,
lowing the termination ofits war with the Allies-by virtue of the 1943 Armi,
stice-nothing prevented Italy from declaring war against Germany and
becoming a co,belligerent with the Allies. The same is true of Romania and
Hungary.
The evolution in the perception of armistice reached its zenith at a later stage,
with a series of General Armistice Agreements signed in 1949 between Israel, on
the one hand, and Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria, on the other,83 followed by
the 1953 Panmunjom Agreement Concerning a Military Armistice in Korea. 84
These Armistice Agreements terminated the Israeli War of Independence and
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the Korean War, respectively, although they did not produce peace in the full
meaning of the term. Typically, the Panmunjom Agreement states as its objective the establishment of an armistice ensuring "a complete cessation of hostilities and of all acts of armed force in Korea until a final peace settlement is
achieved."85 The thesis (advanced in 1992) that "the Korean War is still legally
in effect"86 is untenable.
A closer look at the Israeli Armistice Agreements may illuminate the special
features and the problematics of armistice as a mechanism for ending wars. The
first article of all four Agreements prescribes that, with a view to promoting the
return to permanent peace in Palestine, the parties affirm a number of principles, including a prohibition of resort to military force and aggressive action. 87
In keeping with these principles, the parties are forbidden to commit any warlike or hostile act against one another.88 The Agreements clarify that they are
concluded without prejudice to the "rights, claims and positions"89 of the parties in the ultimate peaceful settlement of the Palestine Question. 90 The purpose of the armistice is described in terms of a transition from truce to a
permanent peace91 (in the case of Egypt, the Armistice Agreement expressly
supersedes a previous General Cease-Fire Agreement.) 92 Above all, the Agreements lay down that they will remain in force until a peaceful settlement between the parties is achieved. 93
The "without prejudice" formula (so popular among lawyers) was introduced to forestall future claims of estoppel in the course of peace negotiations.
The formula must not obscure the salient point that the parties reserve only
their right to reopen all outstanding issues when they eventually get to negotiate an amicable settlement of the conflict. During the intervening time, the
conflict continues, but it is no longer an armed conflict. The thrust of each
Agreement is that both parties waive in an unqualified manner any legal option
that either of them may have had to resume hostilities and to resolve the conflict by force. The Agreements can be considered transitional, inasmuch as
they were intended to be ultimately replaced by definitive peace treaties; yet,
there is nothing temporary about them.94
Article V (2) of the Agreement with Egypt avers that the Armistice Demarcation Line "is not to be construed in any sense as a political or territorial
boundary" and, again, that the line is drawn "without prejudice."95 This clause
is not replicated in the other Agreements, although a more diluted version has
been inserted into Article VI (9) of the Agreement with Jordan96 and Article
V (1) of the Agreement with Syria97 (there is no counterpart in the Agreement
with Lebanon). Once more, the disclaimer may be taken as lip-service. An
analysis of the Agreements in all their aspects shows that "the armistice

142

Yoram Dinstein

demarcation lines can be regarded as equivalent to international frontiers, with
all the consequences which that entails."98 When a line of demarcation be,
tween States is sanctioned in such a way that it can be revised only by mutual
consent (and not by force), it becomes a political or territorial border.99 The
line may not be deemed "final," but the frontiers of no country in the world are
impressed with a stamp of finality. All international frontiers can be altered by
mutual consent, and history shows that many of them undergo kaleidoscopic
modifications through agreements. lOO
It is noteworthy that when the United Nations Security Council, in 1951,
had to deal with an Israeli complaint concerning restrictions imposed by Egypt
on the passage of ships through the Suez Canal, the Council adopted Resolu,
tion 95 pronouncing that the armistice between the two countries "is of a per,
manent character" and that, accordingly, "neither party can reasonably assert
that it is actively a belligerent," lOl lt emerges from the text of the Resolution, and
the thorough discussion preceding it, that the Council totally rejected an Egyptian
contention that a state of war continued to exist with Israel after the Armistice. 102
The Israeli Armistice Agreements carry in their titles the adjective "Gen,
eral." This was done against the backdrop of Article 37 of the Hague Regula,
tions,103 which sets side by side a general and a local armistice {meaning
suspension of hostilities (see infra, section III». The Panmunjom Armistice
Agreement already omits the adjective. The omission is consistent with the
modem meaning of an armistice agreement as an end to war, for a local termi,
nation of war is an oxymoronic figure of speech. An authentic termination of
war must be general in its scope.
No doubt, an armistice agreement is never the equivalent of a treaty of
peace. When it brings war to a close, an armistice is like the first category of
preliminaries of peace (supra, section II (a) ii). Whereas a treaty of peace is
multi, dimensional (both negating war and providing for amicable relations),
an armistice agreement is restricted to the negative aspect of the demise of war.
To the extent that a distinction is drawn between associative and dissociative
peace {the latter amounting to "the absence of war, a peace defined nega,
tively") ,104 an armistice has to be marked as a dissociative peace.
Comparatively speaking, the negation of war is of greater import than the in'
troduction or restoration of, say, trade or cultural relations. Still, when such re,
lations are non, existent, a meaningful ingredient is missing from the fabric of
peace. That is why the mere conclusion of an armistice agreement does not im,
ply recognition of a new State. Furthermore, notwithstanding an armistice,
diplomatic relations need not be established or reestablished. The frontiers
(the Armistice Demarcation Lines) may remain closed, and, in general,
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relations between the former belligerents will probably be strained. After all,
the armed phase of the conflict is over, but the conflict itself may continue
unabated.
As a result, even after an armistice agreement, the conclusion of a treaty of
peace remains a high priority item on the agenda. The armistice ends the war,
but the consummation of a fully-fledged peace requires a lot more. When the
advent of a treaty of peace in the post-armistice period is delayed, as has been
the case both in the Arab-Israeli conflict and in Korea, the chances of another
conflagration always loom large on the political horizon. Nevertheless, should
any of the former belligerents plunge again into hostilities, this would be considered the unleashing of a new war and not the resumption of fighting in an
on-going armed conflict.
There is entrenched resistance in the legal literature to any reappraisal of
the role assigned to armistice in the vocabulary of war. 105 Pace this doctrinal
conservatism, the terminology has to be adjusted to fit the modern practice of
States.1 06 Scholars must open their eyes to the metamorphosis that has occurred over the years in the legal status of armistice.
(c) Other Modes of Terminating War
A war may be brought to its conclusion not only in a treaty of peace or in an
armistice agreement. It may also come to an end in one of the following ways:
i. Implied Mutual Consent
When belligerents enter into a treaty of peace or an armistice agreement,
war is terminated by mutual consent expressed in the instrument. It is not requisite, however, that the mutual consent to end a war be verbalized by the parties. Such consent can also be inferred by implication from their behavior: a
state of war may come to a close thanks to a mere termination of hostilities on
both sides.l°7
An examination of the legal consequences of the absence of warfare must be
conducted prudently. The fact that all is quiet along the front line is not inescapably indicative of a tacit consent to put paid to hostilities. A lull in the fighting, or a formal cease-fire, may account for the military inactivity. War cannot
be regarded as over unless some supplemental evidence is discernible that neither party proposes to resume the hostilities. lOB The evidence may be distilled
from the establishment or resumption of diplomatic relations. 109
To give tangible form to the scenario of a state of war continuing despite a
lengthy hiatus in the fighting, one can take the case of Israel and Iraq. Iraq is
one of the Arab countries that invaded Israel in 1948. Unlike its co-belligerents
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(Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria), Iraq took advantage of the fact that it has
no common border with Israel and refused to sign an armistice agreement (sim~
ply pulling its troops out of the combat zone). After prolonged periods of avoid~
ing a military confrontation, Iraqi and Israeli armed forces clashed again in
June 1967 and in October 1973. 110 In 1981, Israeli aircraft destroyed an Iraqi
nuclear reactor (under construction), which apparently had the capacity of
manufacturing nuclear weapons. 11 I In this writer's opinion, the only plausible
legal justification for the bombing of the reactor is that the act represented an~
other round of hostilities in an on~going armed conflict. In 1991-in the course
of the Gulf War-Iraq launched dozens of Scud missiles against Israeli objec~
tives (mostly, centers of population), despite the fact that Israel was not a mem~
ber of the American~led coalition which had engaged in combat to restore the
sovereignty of Kuwait. The indiscriminate bombardment of civilians, by mis~
siles or otherwise, is unlawful under the jus in bello. IIZ While the jus is the same
in every bellum, it is useful to single out the relevant framework of hostilities.
The Iraqi missile offensive against Israel must be observed in the legal context
not of the Gulf War but of the war between Iraq and Israel which started in
1948 yet continues to this very day. I 13 That war is still in progress, unhindered
by its inordinate prolongation since 1948, for hostilities flare up intermittently.
ii. Debellatio
Debellatio is a situation in which one of the belligerents is utterly defeated, to
the point of its total disintegration as a sovereign nation. Since the war is no
longer inter~State in character, it is terminated by itself. Even though the ex~
tinction of an existing State as a result of war is not to be lightly assumed, there
comes a time when it can no longer be denied. 114
Debellatio necessarily involves effective military occupation of the local terri~
tory by the enemy, but it goes beyond that: all organized resistance has to disap~
pear, and the occupied State must be "reduced to impotence."115 The three
basic parameters of debellatio are as follows: (i) the territory of the former bellig~
erent is occupied in its entirety, no remnant being left for the exercise of sover~
eigntyj (ii) the armed forces of the erstwhile belligerent are no longer in the
field (usually there is an unconditional surrender), and no allied forces carry on
fighting by proxyj and (iii) the Government of the former belligerent has passed
out of existence, and no other Government (not even a Government in exile)
continues to offer effective opposition.11 6 Kuwait was saved from debellatio in
the Gulf War, notwithstanding its total occupation by the Iraqi armed forces,
because its Government went into exile and a large coalition soon came to its
aid militarily.
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The phenomenon of debellatio has been recognized in many instances in
the past. II7 Some commentators contend that a debellatio of Germany oc~
curred at the end of World War II,118 following the unconditional surrender
of the Nazi armed forces. 119 However, the legal status of Germany in the im~
mediate post~War period was exceedingly complicated.1 20 The position was
so intricate that, in the same Allied country (the United Kingdom), different
dates were used for different legal purposes to mark the termination of the war
with Germany.l21

iii. Unilateral Declaration
Just as war can-and, under Hague Convention (III), must-begin with a
unilateral declaration of war, it can also end with a unilateral declaration. 122 In
this way the United States proclaimed, in 1951, the termination of the state of
war with Germany.I23
The technique of a unilateral declaration can be looked upon not as an inde~
pendent mode for bringing war to a close, but as an offshoot of one of the two
preceding methods. State A can impose war on State B by a unilateral declara~
tion or act. Just as State B is unable to prevent State A from submerging them
both in war, State B cannot effectively terminate the war when State A is bent
on continuing it. A unilateral declaration by State B ending the war is an inane
gesture, if State A is able and willing to go on fighting. "For war can be started
by one party, but its ending presupposes the consent of both parties, if the en~
emy state survives as a sovereign state."124 A unilateral declaration by State B
promulgating that the war is over has a valid effect only if State A is either com~
pletely defeated (undergoing debellatio) or is willing to abide by the declara~
tion. 125 Ifboth State A and State B exist at the end of the war, both must agree
to finish it. Yet, such an agreement may consist of a formal declaration by State
B and the tacit consent of State A (or vice versa) .1 26

Ill. The Suspension of Hostilities
(a) Different Types of Suspension of Hostilities
A suspension of hostilities may evolve de facto when no military operations
take place. A respite of this nature may endure for a long period of time. But
since neither belligerent is legally committed to refrain from resuming hostili~
ties, the fighting can break out again at any moment without waming. 127
More importantly, belligerents may assume an obligation de jure to abstain
from combat in the course of a war (which goes on). A number of terms are
used to depict a legal undertaking to suspend hostilities: (i) truce, (ii)
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cease,fire, and, in the past, (iii) armistice. As noted above, the last termarmistice-has undergone a drastic change in recent years and now principally
conveys a termination, rather than a suspension, of hostilities. The current us'
age of the term "cease,fire," in lieu of "armistice," must be recalled when one
examines the aforementioned Articles 36 to 41 of the Hague Regulations.I Z8
These clauses do not employ the phrase "cease,fire." Instead, they refer to "ar,
mistice," commensurately with the vocabulary prevalent at the tum of the cen,
tury. However, since their avowed aim is to govern the suspension of hostilities,
they must be deemed applicable to present,day cease,fires (as opposed to mod,
em armistices).
The expression "truce" is embedded in tradition and history. It acquired par'
ticular resonance in the Middle Ages, in the form of the Truce of God (Treuga
Dei). This was an ecclesiastical measure by which the Catholic Church sus'
pended warfare in Christendom on certain days of the week, as well as during
Lent and church festivals. 1Z9 The phrase "cease,fire" has been introduced into
international legal parlance in the present (post,World War II) era. Although
some scholars ascribe to truce and cease,fire divergent implications, the pres,
ent practice of States-for the most part-treats them as synonymous.130 As
examples for an indiscriminate use of the two terms, it is possible to adduce sue,
cessive resolutions adopted by the Security Council during Israel's War of In,
dependence in 1948. 131
A cease,fire (or truce) may be partial or total in scope. Article 37 of the
Hague Regulations differentiates between a general cease,fire (originally,
"armistice") suspending all military operations everywhere, and a local
cease,fire suspending such operations only between certain units at particular
10cationsPZ

i. Local Cease,Pire Agreement
A cease,fire (or truce) may apply to a limited sector of the front, without im,
pinging on the continuation of combat elsewhere. The object of such a local
suspension of hostilities is to enable the belligerents to evacuate the wounded,
bury the dead, conduct negotiations, and so forth. A local cease,fire may be
agreed upon on the spot by military commanders (who can be relatively junior
in rank), without the involvement of their respective Governments. The agree,
ment would then be informal, and it does not have to be in writing. 133
Article 15 of Geneva Convention (I) of 1949 for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field stipulates
that, whenever circumstances permit, a suspension of hostilities is to be ar,
ranged (generally or locally) so as to facilitate the removal, exchange, and
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transport of the wounded left on the battlefield or within a besieged or encir,
cled area. 134 The article employs the term "armistice," but what is actually
meant in current terminology is a cease,fire.

ii. General Cease,Pire Agreement
Belligerents may enter into an agreement suspending hostilities everywhere
within the region of war. The duration of a general cease,fire (or truce) may be
predetermined in the agreement or it may be left open.
A general cease,fire agreement is normally made in writing by (or with the
approval of) the Governments concerned. In that case, it has the status of a
treaty under international law. 135 The essence of a general cease, fire is a de,
tailed agreement on the conditions under which hostilities are suspended.
There are two sine qua non specific elements: time (at which the cease,fire is
due to enter into force on all fronts; there can also be different times for differ,
ent geographic sectors) and place {fi..'Xing the demarcation line between the op,
posing military formations, with or without a buffer demilitarized zone).136
However, nothing prevents the parties from appending to a general cease,fire
agreement other clauses which transcend the technicalities of the suspension
of hostilities and relate to such matters as the immediate release of prisoners of
war. Semantically, this is liable to produce a result which may sound strange.
Should the general cease, fire agreement set a date for release of prisoners of
war, and should a belligerent extend their detention beyond that date, the act
would constitute a cease,fire violation although no fire has been opened.
iii. Cease,Pire Ordered by the Security Council
The Security Council, performing its functions under Chapter VII of the
Charter of the United Nations,137 may order belligerents to cease fire. Un,
equivocal language to that effect is contained, for example, in Resolution 54
(1948),138 adopted at the time ofIsrael's War ofIndependence. Under Article
25 of the Charter, UN members are legally bound to accept and carry out man,
datory decisions of the Security Council.139 However, the Council does not
rush to issue direct orders. Ordinarily, it shows a proclivity for milder language.
In the Falkland Islands War of 1982, the Council only requested the Secre,
tary,General "to enter into contact with the parties with a view to negotiating
mutually acceptable terms for cease,fire."140 On other occasions, the Council
called upon the parties to cease fire,141 and less frequently demanded a
cease,fire)42 As long as the Council is merely calling for a cease,fire, its resolu,
tion has the hallmark of a non,binding recommendation. The parties are then
given an opportunity to craft a cease,fire agreement of their choosing. But if
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they fail to reach an agreement, the Council may be driven in time to ordain a
cease,fire. In the Iran,Iraq War, the Security Council issued a call for a cease,fire
in 1982,143 demanding it only in 1987. 144 The text and the circumstances clearly
imply that "the change in the wording from calling for a cease,fire to demanding
one" conveyed a shift from a recommendation to a binding decision.I 45
The most peremptory and far,reaching cease,fire terms ever resorted to by
the Security Council were imposed on Iraq in Resolution 687 (1991),146 after
the defeat of that country by an American,led coalition (with the direct bless,
ing of the Council) in the Gulf War. Resolution 687 "is unparalleled in the ex,
tent to which the Security Council" was prepared to go in dictating cease,fire
conditions (especially where disarmament is concemed).I 47 Nevertheless, as
the text of the Resolution explicitly elucidates, it brings into effect no more
than "a formal cease,fire."148 A labelling of Resolution 687 as a "permanent
cease,fire"149 is a contradiction in terms: a cease,fire, by definition, is a transi,
tion,period arrangement. The suggestion that "despite the terminology used in
Resolution 687, it is clearly more than a mere suspen~ion ofhostilities"-for
the substance "is that of a peace treaty" 150_is not only completely inconsistent
with the plain text of the resolution, it is also counterfactual, given subsequent
history. At various points since 1991, and almost on a routine basis after De,
cember 1998, coalition (mostly U.S. and UK) warplanes have struck Iraqi mili,
tary targets (especially in so' called "no,fly zones"). The air campaign must be
seen as a resumption of military operations in the face ofIraqi violations of the
cease,fire terms. 151 These are continued hostilities in a war, which commenced
when Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990.
The General Assembly, too, may call upon belligerents to effect an immedi,
ate cease,fire. This is what the General Assembly did in December 1971,152 af,
ter the outbreak of war between India and Pakistan (ultimately culminating in
the creation of the independent State of Bangladesh). When such a resolution
is passed by the General Assembly, it can only be issued as a recommendation
and can never be binding. As a non,mandatory exhortation, the resolution may
be ignored with impunity, just as India disregarded the resolution in question. 153
In recent years, most cease,fires have come in the wake of Security Council
resolutions. Either the parties carry out a mandatory decision of the Councilor
they arrive at an agreement at the behest of the Council. Even during the "Colef
War," as long as the Council was not in disarray owing to the exercise or the
threat of a veto, a cease,fire resolution became almost a conditioned reflex in
response to the outbreak of hostilities. Generally speaking, the Council has
tended to act as a fire brigade, viewing its paramount task as an attempt to ex,
tinguish the blaze rather than dealing with all the surrounding circumstances.
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A cease,fire directive by the Council, like an agreement between the
belligerents, may be limited to a predetermined time frame. A case in point is
Resolution 50 (1948), adopted in the course oflsrael's War oflndependence,
which called upon all the parties to cease fire for a period of four weeks. 154
When the prescribed time expired, fighting recommenced. More often, the
Council avoids setting specific terminal dates for cease,fires, preferring to
couch them in an open,ended manner.
(b) The Nature of Cease' Fire
The suspension of hostilities must not be confused with their termina,
tion. 155 A termination of hostilities means that the war is over-the parties are
no longer belligerents, and any subsequent hostilities between them would in,
dicate the outbreak of a new war. Conversely, a suspension of hostilities con,
notes that the state of war goes on, but temporarily there is no actual warfare.
Psychologically, a protracted general cease, fire lasting indefinitely is a state of
no,war and no'peace. Legally, this is a clear,cut case of war. The state of war is
not terminated, despite the absence of combat in the interval.
Renewal of hostilities before a cease,fire expires would obviously contravene
its provisions. Nonetheless, it must be grasped that hostilities are only contin,
ued, after an interruption, and no new war is started. For that reason, a
cease,fire violation is irrelevant to the determination of armed attack and
self,defense. That determination is made exclusively on the basis of the begin'
ning of a new armed conflict. The reopening of fire in an on,going war is not
germane to the issue. 156
A cease,fire provides "a breathing space for the negotiation of more lasting
agreements."157 It gives the belligerents a chance to negotiate peace terms
without being subjected to excessive pressure, and to turn the suspension into a
termination of hostilities. But no indispensable bond ties cease,fire and peace.
On the one hand, a treaty of peace may not be preceded by any cease,fire.l 58 On
the other hand, a cease,fire may break down, to be followed by further bloodshed.
The pause in the fighting, brought about by a cease,fire, is no more than a
convenient juncture for peace negotiations. Even a binding cease,fire decree
issued by the Security Council may prove "too brittle to withstand the strains
between the parties" over a protracted period. 159 Should the parties fail to ex,
ploit the opportunity, the period of quiescence is likely to become a springboard
for additional rounds of hostilities (perhaps more intense). This is only to be
anticipated. A cease,fire, in freezing the military state of affairs extant at the
moment when combat is suspended, places in an advantageous position that
party which gained the most ground before the deadline. While the guns are
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silent, the opposing sides will rearm and regroup. If no peace is attained, the
belligerent most interested in a return to the status quo ante will look for a favor ~
able moment (militarily as well as politically) to mount an offensive, in order to
dislodge the enemy from the positions acquired on the eve of the cease~fire. A
cease~fire in and of itself is, consequently, no harbinger of peace. All that a
cease~fire can accomplish is set the stage for negotiations or any other mode of
amicable settlement of disputes. If the parties contrive to hammer out peace
terms, success will be due more to the exercise of diplomatic and political skills
than to the cease~fire as such.
The Arab~Israeli conflict is a classical illustration of a whole host of
cease~fires, either by consensual arrangement between the parties or by fiat of
the Security Council, halting hostilities without bringing them to an end. Thus,
if we take as an example the mislabelled "Six Days War" (sparked in June 1967
and proceeding through several cycles of hostilities), the Council insisted on
immediate cease~fire, e.g., in June 1967 160 and in October 1973.1 61 Israel and
Egypt negotiated a cease~fire agreement, e.g., in November 1973. 162 Israel and
Syria agreed on a cease~fire, e.g., in May 1974. 163 In none of these cases did the
cease~fire, whether initiated by the parties or by the Council, terminate the
war. In the relations between Israel, on the one hand, and Egypt and Jordan, on
the other, the "Six Days War" ended only upon (or on the eve of) the conclu~
sion of Treaties of Peace in 1979 and 1994 respectively (see supra, section II (a)
i). In the relations between Israel and Syria, the "Six Days War" is not over yet,
after more than three decades, since the bilateral peace process has not yet
been crowned with success. A number of rounds of hostilities between Israel
and Egypt or Syria (most conspicuously, the so~called "Yom Kippur War" of
October 1973) are incorrectly adverted to as "wars." Far from qualifying as sepa~
rate wars, these were merely non~consecutive time~frames of combat, punctu~
ated by extended cease~fires, in the course of a single on~going war which had
commenced in June 1967.
(c) Denunciation and Breach ofCease~Fire
Under Article 36 of the Hague Regulations, if the duration of a suspension
of hostilities is not defined, each belligerent may resume military operations at
any time, provided that an appropriate warning is given in accordance with the
terms of the cease~fire {originally, "armistice").1 64 The language of Article 36
seems to this writer to be imprecise. It is submitted that a general cease~fire, if
concluded without specifying a finite date of expiry, ought to be read in good
faith as if it were undertaken for a reasonable period. Within that (admittedly
flexible) stretch of time, none of the parties can be allowed to denounce the
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cease~fire unilaterally. Hence, it is not legitimate for a belligerent (relying on
Article 36) to flout the cease~fire shortly after its conclusion. Only when a rea~
sonable period has elapsed does the continued operation of the agreement de~
pend on the good will of both parties, and the cease~fire can be unilaterally
denounced at will.
Article 36 contains an obligation to give advance notice to the adversary
when denunciation of a cease~fire agreement occurs. But the specifics depend
on what the cease~fire agreement prescribes. It appears that when the agree~
ment is silent on this issue, hostilities may be "recommenced at once after noti~
fication."165 If fire can be opened at once, the practical value of notification
becomes inconsequential. 166
Cease~fire (originally, "armistice") violations are the theme of Articles 40
and 41 of the Hague Regulations. Article 41 pronounces that, should the viola~
tions be committed by private individuals acting on their own initiative, the in~
jured party would be entitled to demand their punishment or compensation for
any losses sustained. 167 Under Article 40, a serious violation of the cease~fire by
one of the parties empowers the other side to denounce it and, in cases of ur~
gency, to resume hostilities immediately.1 68

Articles 40 and 41 posit, in effect, a three~pronged classification of cease~fire
violations: (i) ordinary violations, not justifying denunciation of the cease~fire
(assuming that denunciation is not otherwise permissible under Article 36);
(ii) serious violations, permitting the victim to denounce the cease~fire, but re~
quiring advance notice before the recommencement of hostilities; and (iii) se~
rious violations pregnant with urgency, enabling the victim to denounce the
cease~fire and reopen hostilities immediately (without advance notice).1 69
The three categories of cease~fire violations are not easily applicable in real~
ity. The question of whether a breach of the cease~fire is serious, or whether any
urgency is involved, seldom lends itself to objective verification. It must not be
overlooked that a violation considered a minor infraction by one party may as~
sume grave proportions in the eyes of the antagonist. 170 At the same time, the
emphasis placed by Article 40 on serious cease~fire violations is consistent with
the reference to a "material breach" appearing in Article 60(1) of the 1969 Vi~
enna Convention on the Law ofTreaties (in the general context of termination
of bilateral treaties).171
IV. Conclusion
The three separate stages in the course of war-its initiation, suspension
and termination-are easy to tell apart in the abstract. Yet, frequently,
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international lawyers sharply disagree with one another about the interpreta~
tion of international instruments, and the consequences of actions taken by
belligerents, when expressions such as declarations of war, truces, cease~fires
and armistices are employed. To some extent, the lack of consensus is due to
the linguistic evolution of modem international law since its inception some
350 years ago. The passage of time has brought about alterations in interna~
tionallegal terms of art.
The purpose of the present essay is to shed some light on the correct mean~
ing of the contemporary vocabulary of war. This vocabulary is bound to de~
velop further in the years ahead. However, at the end of the second
millennium, its definitional range can be fairly settled against the background
of the recent practice of States. Terminological exactitude is not merely a mat~
ter of fastidiousness. It gives rise to a better understanding of the implications
and ramifications of what States do in the world of reality.
This essay is a revised and updated version of Chapter 2 of the author's
(2nd ed.,1994).
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